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REPLY TO PART I 
Respondent attempts to treat the 
second paragraph of the Will as if it 
were the only provision therein. It 
is true that the grant contained in 
the second paragraph of the Will is 
in indefinite language stating neither 
fee nor life estate and stating no 
duration. 
If the provision could stand alone 
without qualification by other provisions 
of the Will, there is no questi~n but 
that the law by a presumption will 
create the maximum estate, (See Section 
57-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, for 
conveyances~ and Section 74-1-36, Utah 
Code annotated, 1953~ for devise) but 
the law requires giving effect to all 
the provisions of a Will where possible 
and as a consequence one provision can-
not be treated in cont:ridictio:n 't«) the 
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balance of the Will where all provi-
sions may receive a consistant effect. 
It is contended that the Testatrix 
inserted the following 5 provisions in 
the Will to provide what happens "in 
the event the children do not get the 
fee." Such a contention is contrary 
to the repeated, unambiguous, and 
clear declarations of the Testatrix, 
and requires an interpretation that 
makes many provisions inconsistant. 
By giving normal meaning to the terms, 
all provisions can be given consistant 
effect. 
It is acknowledged that the pro-
perty, at the time of the execution 
of the Will, would produce a relatively 
small income. 
fruit orchard. 
It was being used as a 
But this is precisely 
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the reason for the seventh provision 
in the will giving the executor the 
power to exhange the asset for A.T.&To 
Stock. 
The case of Schomp vs. Brown, 335p 
2d 847 does not rule as contended by 
respondent. In addition, it is distin-
guishable because the first taker was 
granted a power to invade the corpus. 
The court refused to impose a trust for 
the remainderman because of the power 
to invade, but declared that the gift 
over estate holder had a cause of action 
in the event the first taker failed to 
fulfill the commitments imposed for 
the protection of the following estate. 
The rule attributed by Respondent 
to Parker vs. Parker, 46 Mass 134 is 
agreed with provided duration is not 
given and provided it is not coupled 
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with provisions that modify. This is 
the presumption mentioned above~ 
Chapman v. Check, 16 A. 407, 409, 
81 Meo 109 cited by Respondant states 
the rule alledged by Appellant: That 
it is a general description of the 
property, not a statement of the size 
of the estate created. 
It is argued that an estate vested 
upon the Testatrix's death, in Orvis 
Call and Bessie Call Nielson. This 
is agreed with, but our question con-
cerns the size ot the estate that vestedy 
not the time of vesting. The law 
favors early vesting (i.e. time of 
testatrix's death) where possible. 
33 Am Jur, Life Estates, Remainders, 
s Etc. s 106. There is no reason why the 
estate granted Orvis Call, Bessie Call 
Nielson and Don Lewis Ryan could not 
vest upon the testatrix's deathe Ob-
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viously this is the case here .. 
In re Colleais Estate, 233 p 2d 
554 cited by respondant is distinguish-
able because there was a request of the 
first taker and not clear gift over .. 
The rule in Pruse v. Beasley, 335 
p 2d 346 as set forth in Respondants 
brief is misleading because it omits 
a part of the rule as quoted in that 
case. 
'~ devise of the residue a 
testators property posses all 
of the property which he was 
entitled to devise or bequeath 
at the time of his death not 
otherwise eff rectuall¥ ~~l~s'(f£ 
or bequeathed by fils w:tlll,-,= 
Appellant concurs with this 1n 
its complete form~ 
Shippy v .. Elliott, 327 p 
distinguishable b~:cause the gift i•orve:r 
was not mandatory but merely in te~1l¥.~:s 
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of desire of testatrix& Also, the 
first taker had an unlimited power to 
invade the corpus. 
The same can be said of Fields 
vs. Fields, 3 p 2d 771 .. 
REPLY TO PART II 
Respondant's argument assumes the 
very point in question. The question 
is whether or not a fee was created not 
whether or not there is an attempt to 
cut it down. 
It is argued that a grant for life 
with a remainder following gives nothing 
to the first taker~ It is believed that 
such a novel theory needs no reply .. 
It is contended that the Will does 
not give a basis to divide the estate., 
A deed granting an express life estate 
followed by an ess remainde:rc 
does not contain a basis of div:li~Li(l,n., 
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The answer is obvious. The law of 
estates defines the rights and duties 
of each estate. There is no contention 
that the estates are divided. 
The citations of the repugnancy 
rule by respondant is not disputed. 
The issue in our case is different. 
The question before the court is the 
size of the estate. It is argued that 
the terms of the Will should be con-
strued inconsistant with each other so 
that the repugnancy doctrine can apply. 
Such is contrary to law. Section 
74-2-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
REPLY TO PART III 
Appellant's argument in the original 
brief deals with the issue of lapse 
raised by Respondant at Part Ills Re-
spondant, however, goes much in detail 
on the time of the vesting of estates 
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.,.,g ... 
contingent upon the death of the first 
takerQ The vesting of the estate in 
Don Lewis Ryan is in absolutely no wa~r 
contingent upon the death of the first 
takero Only possession must await the 
termination of the life estatem The 
vesting of the estate in Don Lewis 
Ryan was contingent only upon his sur-
viving the testatrix.. There can be 
no dispute under the law on the time 
of the vesting of this estatea It is 
not at issue. 
The cases cited by Respondent deals 
with the time of vesting of estates 
contingent upon death. 
In re Gormley's Estate, 338 p 2d 
457 is distinguishable because the grant 
to the first taker was in 'Ycomplete amJ 
perfect ownership" and also time of vest-
ing was at issueo 
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REPLY TO PART IV 
The seventh provision is in man-
datory language. It authorizes the 
sale of the property for the express 
purpose of substituting alternative 
property. The language is not mere 
permission or words of request, it 
is a command. There is no need for 
a power to exchange the asset if the 
estate is in fee simple - such is one 
of the inherent rights of a fee simple. 
However, such power is not inherent 
with a life estate and must be specif-
ically given to be free of protest by 
the remainderman. 
It is contended that the power of 
exchange is an absolute power of dis-
position. This seems novel in view 
of the compulsory purchase of stock 
from said sale. It is a power broad 
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enough to exchange the asset for stock 
only. It is difficult to imagine a 
more restricted power of disposition. 
Such power is logically consistant only 
with a life estate. 
It is true that if we could construe 
only parts of a will and completely 
disregard all other parts that any grant 
to a person or persons without further 
qualification regardless of the share 
of each grantee would create a fee 
simple by operation of the recognized 
presumption. But the seventh provision, 
like the second provision of the will, 
does not stand alone. 
One of the distinguishing factors 
of a life estate is that the duration 
of such estate is always for the period 
of a life as lives. 
In the will in question, the 
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Juration of the estate of the first 
takers is given clearly in the third, 
fourth, and fifth provisions, all of 
which show the termination time of 
such estate to be at their death~ 
The seventh provision does not 
give a different duration than exists 
for the second paragraphQ There is no 
increase of right granted in the seventh 
paragraph over that given in the second 
paragraph .. 
The seventh paragraph does not 
alter the nshares devised" except in 
the form of the corpus~ By the second 
provision of the Will, Orvis Call and 
Bessie Call Nielson was to take this 
property share and share alikec The 
seventh provision only establishes th 
same ownerships in the substituted 
asset that existed in the asset 
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granted by the second paragrapha 
It is urged that the presumption 
that elevates indefinite gifts 
standing alone to fee simple should 
operate here in spite of the fact 
that it would change the express given 
duration of the shares devised to Orvis 
Call and Bessie Call Nielson. This 
Will is perfectly capable of a con-
struction that interprets each part 
thereof in relation to each other so 
as to form a consistant whole as re-
quired by Section 74=2=5, UCA, 1953~ 
This is possible without adding words 
to the will as urged by Respondant 
(Respondant's brief p 15) and without 
any repugnance becau~H~ of inconsistancy., 
This requires an interpretation, however, 
that the first takers receive life estates. 
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REPLY TO PART V 
Council makes a point that the 
granting provisions of the Will does 
n~t say life estate~ It also does not 
say fee simple~ It is simply a grant in 
i'ndefinite terms indicating neither life 
estate nor fee which is coupled with a 
restricted power of exchange with a gift 
over upon the death of the first takersQ 
(See 33 Am jur, Life Estates, Remainders, 
Etc. ~ 30; 36 ALR 1080; 76 ALR 1154; 7 ALR 
838; 10 ALR 756; 17 ALR 2d 7; 75 ALR 71; 
Am Law Institute, Property, Vol,l, § llle 
The balance of the cont rent io:n.s of 
Part V merely assume the question in point 
. namely, what was the size of the estate~ 
Respondant argues rules of law that take 
effect only after it is determined that t 
estate is in fee or that the power of ex-
change is an abscolut e power o·iF dH spos:i n 
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REPLY TO PART VI 
The contention that the interpre= 
ta~ion of the trial court is consistant 
with the whole will seems best refuted 
by respondant's arguments on repugnancy 
(respondant's brief pp 9-13)G Even 
respondant acknowledges that the trial 
court's ruling requires the repugnancy 
doctrine because of inconsistancy as 
well as the addition of words to the 
terms set forth in the will. 
The balance of the contentions of 
respondants brief cone erni ng a1 a~ 1 edged 
attempt by Don Lewis Rvan to :aKe the 
estates of the first taker and a sup· 
posed burden being placed the-eon jus~ 
is not in conformity 1t1rith the al"' 'gatJ..ons 
of appellant. He cl an estatQ in 
remainder and no more~ 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondant's brief fails to supply 
any support that would vary the required 
rules of constructiona Not one case 
h~s been cited that w~s not distin~ 
contentions of Respondant0 
Respectfully submitted, 
a\TCH & CHIDESTER 
Attorney~ for Appellant 
51 West Center St~eet 
Heber'i! Ut@!.h 
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